“Sanctions Politics,” Or Who Helps Putin to Strengthen Authoritarianism.

Abstract

More than two decades have passed since the demise of the Soviet Union and the establishment of fifteen successor states. Ukraine, which was a core component of Russia’s former empire, has emerged as a pivotal actor in Russia’s relationship with the West, as elements within Ukraine pull the country in opposite directions -- that is, toward the East and the West. Armed conflict has developed, and Russia’s relationship with the West has become frayed, with potential consequences for peace and stability in Europe. This essay surveys this present state of affairs, and assesses the implications of the U.S.-led sanctions regime that has been put in place against Russia.

1. Introduction

Rash politics can bring more harm than benefit in international relations. While the stated goal of most sanctions regimes is to bring about some “better” state of affairs, the reality is that sanctions sometimes help to make the situation worse. Germany is a case in point. As a result of the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and crippling reparations and sanctions over the course of the next two decades, a social and political environment was fostered Germany that made the rise of Adolph Hitler possible. The Nazi regime, which could not have taken the reins of power without popular public support, sought to avenge these hardships that had been wrought against the German people. Hitler emerged as the one leader who was up to the task, and the world paid a bloody price between 1939 and 1945. The experience of Germany comes to mind when we observe the contemporary situation involving Ukraine and Russia. We see at play, yet again, the rash, didactic language of ultimatums and sanctions, this time directed at Russia. As was the case back in the 1920s and 30s, the situation in Europe is becoming tenser. Peace and stability are threatened.

2. The Emergence of Ukraine as a Nation-State

More than two decades have passed since the time of the demise of the Soviet Union, which gave birth to fifteen successor states. The establishment of Ukraine as a nation-state is a particularly complex dynamic. Long dependent on Russian resources and power, Ukraine’s pendulum finally appears to be swinging away from dependence on its eastern neighbor and toward the West. Ukraine lacks any of the trappings of democracy or the market economy as espoused in the West, and corruption and economic mismanagement have flourished there since the collapse of communism. It could quite possibly turn out that Ukraine, with its myriad and complex challenges, might become a new burden for the European Union. For better or worse, the country’s future appears to be coming into view.

2.1. Ukraine between Russia and the West

As would have been expected, the Kremlin stands as the major opponent of Ukraine’s drift towards the West. But the problem extends far beyond the Kremlin’s walls. To understand why Russians are not happy with Ukraine’s “westernization” project, one must consider the deep and long-standing ties that the two nations share. Outsiders look at the current situation involving Ukraine and conclude that Russian political craftiness is at play. But in actuality, Russia is experiencing a national heartache over what its people see as the tearing away of a large piece of its former “empire,” formed more than a thousand years ago. For the majority of Russians, Ukraine’s westward drift means much more than just the adoption of policies that are friendly to Brussels and Washington. Its slide towards the West, away from its “Eastern Slavic commonality,” represents the dissipation of Russian civilization. It also signifies the loss of their Orthodox brethren in a religiously determined “penultimate battle of Russia against a sinful West.”

3. U.S. and Western Sanctions against Russia

It should not have surprised anyone that Putin’s popularity at home increased dramatically after the annexation of Crimea. Russians, paternalistically, wanted to believe that they were witnessing an important first step, a “restoration of historical fairness” in the reunion of former Russian lands and peoples. Hopes that other territories would reunite with Russia right away after Crimea were dispelled by strong political resistance from the West, including the sanctions that have been imposed on Russia. Technically, the sanctions themselves have been levied against Russia’s leadership and business elites. Practically, they “punish” more than a hundred million of people who were not involved in the decision-making process about Crimea or Ukraine in general. The vast majority of Russians now view these sanctions personally, as a slight against their country and not just a spat between the U.S. State Department and the Kremlin. Even many of those in Russia who had sympathized with the West have aligned themselves with President Putin.

The fragile sprouts of Russian democracy have not been helped by the U.S.-led sanctions and bossy rhetoric from Washington. Over the last fifteen years and before the crisis in Ukraine, Washington was either directly or indirectly involved in conflicts in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, farther away from Russia’s borders. And despite occasional official grumbling from the Kremlin, the new Russian-NATO strategic partnership and with the “reset” in US-Russian relations were functioning and even showed some promise. Now, however, these initiatives are dead, and Washington’s heavy-handed involvement in the Ukrainian crisis has provided the Putin leadership with ammunition against those who were convinced that the United States could be a reliable partner for Russia. For the majority of Russians, the United States has reignited a cold war, and it will be extremely difficult to reestablish a climate where trust can grow. U.S. “sanctions politics,” more than any other factor, have brought U.S.-Russian relations to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War.

3.1. “Sanctions Politics” and Their Implications

Not only have the sanctions and commanding rhetoric from Washington provided the Kremlin with leverage against the government’s democratic and liberal opponents, but also against media in Russia. In fact, the more the United States and its allies tighten the sanctions program, the less evident is criticism of Putin’s politics in the Russian media. Moreover, these sanctions and increasing hostility from the West help to justify the Kremlin’s plans to rebuild and expand the country’s military, which, of course, will increase the overall threat to U.S.

forces and their European allies. Unless confrontation in Europe is their aim, leaders in Washington would do well to work not just with diplomats, economists, and military experts, but also with historians, political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and “public diplomacy” representatives who understand Russia and know how to communicate with her more effectively. To be sure, the Russian case is somewhat special and different from that of Iraq or Iran.

The historical record for the past several hundred years reveals that most of Russia’s successes have come when the country is governed by a strong, charismatic leader and there is an identifiable external threat against which the Russian people can unify. So, if the goal of Russia’s counterparts is to make the Russian state more authoritarian and its leader stronger, the counterparts will simply act and communicate in ways that convince the country’s leader and his people (through sanctions, bossy rhetoric, military maneuvers near Russian borders, and so on) that Russia’s foreign counterparts indeed represent a real threat. On the other hand, if the goal is to peacefully integrate Russia into the global community (which, if we will be patient, sooner or later will happen anyway), Russia’s counterparts must foster a relationship with the country that emphasizes productive communication and cooperation. It is just as simple as that. In that vein, the Ukraine situation presented itself as an as an important opportunity that has been missed. Years ago, that country could have become a peaceful and democratic bridge between the West and Russia, instead of some coveted “prize” for Washington and its European allies. And now “sanctions politics” aggravate the overall situation and threaten further conflict.

Indeed, many of Putin’s methods will look like the politics of the past. But that does not mean that Washington should automatically respond to Russian moves according to the dictates of outdated paradigms. What might work for Iran or Syria would not necessarily work for Russia, and the United States must resist this temptation. Russians are quite sensitive about being treated with respect on the world stage and are more likely to negotiate and collaborate when they are approached with the language of respect and cooperation and not that of superiority and ultimatums. Sanctions are not something that might deter Russians if they perceive that their country is being encroached upon, through the territory of Ukraine or from wherever. In fact, it is a lesson of history that Russians have rallied around their leaders, have been ready to endure hardships and tribulations, and have been ready to fight to meet external threats. During such periods in Russian history, two socio-psychological dynamics were evident: a powerful enemy that presents an existential threat to the nation, and, a perception among Russians that the nation as a whole is a victim. The advice to Washington would be obvious – don’t help Putin present to his people the case that the United States is a powerful enemy, and don’t convince Russians that they, by virtue of a new policy of containment, are innocent victims of U.S./Western aggression.

4. Conclusion

So to sum up, we are not saying that Washington should not react at all to Russia’s current policy and actions toward Ukraine. Rather, we contend that the sanctions regime and related threatening tools are not universal and in the Russian case work against peace and security. Obviously, it will be easier to influence your partner while you remain partners and not after you have already “divorced.” There are many possible opportunities for productive relations while Russia and the Western countries are still partners; there are far fewer such opportunities once they become enemies. Let’s not push the relationship into one between enemies. For a number of reasons, some of which were mentioned above, Ukraine would not be an attractive or easily manageable “prize” for the West anyway, with or without Russia’s presence. Russia’s relations with the United States should focus on what is prudent and possible at this time, and then work towards the future. Punishment should not become a tool that dictates twenty-first century international relations. Let’s not allow bossy rhetoric and primitive “Sanctions Politics” to derail U.S.-Russian relations. It is not too late to explore other possibilities for the benefit of a better and peaceful Europe.

Acknowledgements

Special gratitude to R.B. for his frank and thoughtful commentary and general support.

References

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Demirjian, K., & Birnbaum, M. (2014). Russia’s Putin Blames U.S. for Destabilizing World Order. The Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russias-putin-blames-us-for-destabilizing-world-order/2014/10/24/1c2e684f-6c00-41a0-8458-03533d644657_story.html

Karaganov, S. (2014). Western delusions triggered this conflict and Russians will not yield. Russia in Global Affairs. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Western-delusions-triggered-this-conflict-and-Russians-will-not-yield-16968

July-November 2014

Gregory O. Hall, Department of Political Science, Morehouse College, Atlanta, Georgia, USA

Denis V. Makarov, Foundation for the Development of Civic Culture, Moscow, Russia